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Nord-Ost – a Russian musical based on Veniamin Kaverin’s novel that tells the story 
of a World War II Soviet pilot in his search for truth about a long-forgotten captain’s 
expedition to the North Pole. It came as a complete shock, when on a late October evening in 
2002, merely fifteen minutes into the second act of the show, forty Chechen militants burst 
onto the stage of the Dubrovka Palace of Culture in the centre of Moscow, beginning a 
horrifying three-day siege of the theatre (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2002). 
Bataclan – a much more recent tragedy, gripped the headlines of the world news in 
November 2015, when three heavily armed gunmen stormed into the Bataclan concert hall in 
Paris, shooting at the crowd and taking the audience hostage. The event that shocked the 
world, took eighty-nine lives and left at least ninety-nine injured in its wake, came as a 
complete surprise to everyone (Joshi, 2015). 
There is a disturbing commonality between the two countries in that neither France, 
nor Russia saw this kind of attack coming (Robinson, 2015; Goodman, 2015; Murza, 2015). 
This is not, however, where the commonalities end; both countries are multi-ethnic and 
largely multi-confessional, while in a way embodying and exemplifying a certain political 
ideology, the combination of which often makes them the epicentres of inter-cultural conflict. 
The two countries have over the years become the targets of choice for, among others, jihadi 
extremists, as well as various other radical and anarchist groups (Telegraph, 2016). Other 
countries that, according to some observations, share a similar profile, are easy to identify: 
the United Kingdom and the United States (Barnato, 2016; GTD, 2016).  
Various radical cells have already targeted the public transportation systems in major 






Paris (1995, 1996); bombing airports, buses, subway stations and other public places 
(Combs, 2007; Whitney, 1996, Riding, 2002). They make attractive targets, as they offer 
relatively easy and open access to anyone, are usually filled with people at predictable times 
and, depending on the mode of transportation, can yield high numbers of casualties. 
While transport has proven to be a popular target among terrorist organizations, 
another trend has been emerging for the past two decades: there have been at least two 
successful attacks on theatres in Moscow (2002) and Paris (2015), as well as a bombing 
attempt outside the Minskoff Theatre in 2010. The exploration of theatres as targets has 
proven effective, with body counts in both successful attempts nearing or exceeding a 
hundred people (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2003).  Compared to public transportation, theatres 
are much more attractive for such attacks because of their large capacities (for most 
Broadway theatres, seating capacity exceeds a thousand people), with captive audience 
members seated in an orderly fashion, which reduces the chaos and unpredictability of a 
hostage-taking situation, making it easier for the radicals to plan out their actions once inside 
the venue. Additionally, theatres stay in one location, allowing terrorists ample time to survey 
the venue, explore its inner workings and plan their attack. Another reason why a theatre can 
be so attractive, especially for radical Islamists, is that it symbolises a certain way of life and, 
in many ways, in their eyes can stand for western values, such as freedom of expression, 
gender equality and empowerment of women and minorities, as well as acceptance and 
celebration of diversity, be it racial or religious which are not necessarily as strongly 
appreciated by Islamic extremists as they are by the western world.  
This paper will focus on investigating the security issues the Broadway community is 






between the measures implemented in the country that has experienced an attack on one of 
its theatres (Russia) and the United States, a country which can hardly brag about being 
terrorist-free, however has never had this particular type of target attacked on its soil. While 
Russian theatres now use a wide range of preventive measures, including sniffer dogs, 
metal-detector frames, handheld metal detector wands, theatre zoning, selective employee 
access and more, Broadway, located at the very heart of New York, one of the biggest tourist 
magnets in the world, barely uses half of these measures. Observing this careless 
endangerment of theatre employees and patrons has become the catalyst for this paper. 
In order to understand how these attacks could have been prevented, or the number of 
casualties reduced, it is vital to reconstruct the sequence of the attackers’ actions, how they 
gained access to the building, whether they brought all their weapons with them or had them 
planted ahead of time, and if and how they gained access to service and backstage areas. 
This paper will examine the incidents in detail and attempt to propose solutions to address 
the current vulnerabilities of Broadway theatres. Chapter 1 will provide a brief overview of the 
current and emerging trends in domestic and international terrorism, discussing their 
relevance to the theme of this thesis. Chapter 2 will provide an in-depth look at the events at 
the Dubrovka theatre in October 2002, when a coordinated attack was executed by a host of 
Chechen extremists, taking hostage over 900 theatregoers and employees. Chapter 3 will 
discuss the November 2015 attack on Stade de France and the Bataclan Concert Hall carried 
out by ISIS forces. The fourth chapter will look into the possible effects of new security 
measures being implemented and what considerations may be halting their application on 
Broadway and in other regions around the world. The chapter will then go on to offer a range 
of measures either already in use in some theatres in the world, or about to be implemented, 






Chapter 1: Trends in domestic and international terrorism 
This chapter will look into several trends currently emerging in international and 
domestic terrorism, such as the decentralization of the jihadi movement leading to its 
reshaping into a number of smaller cells around the world, which sometimes operate on their 
own, following principles and rules known only to them. One of the other trends discussed 
below is availability of fewer resources and less funding for those individual units, leading to 
higher reliance on self-made devices.  Finally, a lack of demands or any serious attempts to 
negotiate with authorities is also explored in this chapter. 
One of the trends that can be observed over the course of the last two decades is the 
devolution of the jihadi movement from being an organizational structure with centralized 
leadership to an amorphous network of regional franchises, each of which may sometimes 
act completely autonomously. This chaotic structure and the lack of interdependence among 
the franchises is part of what makes the movement in question the Lernaean Hydra for 
modern security, military and law enforcement professionals (Stewart, 2012). This regional 
organization may also be contributing to the rise of domestic terrorism, with more and more 
would-be attackers becoming radicalised while they are already legally residing in the country 
that would become a target for the attack. This is exemplified by the case of Bataclan, where 
a series of coordinated attacks is believed to have been planned and orchestrated by an 
ISIS-affiliated radical Islamist cell consisting of eight people, two of whom, Ahmad Al 
Mohammad and Abbdulakbak B, were allegedly Syrian nationals who came to Belgium’s 
town of Molenbeek (also known as the terrorist capital of Europe) by ferry from Greece 
(Walker, Bisserbe, 2015; France24, 2015). Molenbeek is notorious for radicalisation and is 
exactly where two other members of the group, Belgian-born French national Salah 






Abdelhamid Abaaoud, were residing. Two more terrorists were identified as Bilal Hadfi, a 
French national living in Belgium, and a French citizen, Omar Ismail Mostefai, raised in 
Courcouronnes, a poor neighbourhood of Paris (RT_com, 2015). Sami Amimour, identified as 
one of the three gunmen at Bataclan, was a French national who is believed to have visited 
Syria where he was radicalized (Farmer, 2016) .  
Perhaps due to the increasing decentralisation and adoption of a localised franchise 
structure of the jihadi movement, individual units are receiving fewer resources and less 
funding. This leads to heavier reliance on self-made explosive devices, and encourages 
outreach to sources already on United States soil in order to receive the necessary training 
and purchase the required components for said devices. These early stages of planning an 
attack in America can sometimes provide better opportunities for the homeland security and 
other relevant agencies to survey, detect and prevent a tragedy, than when the preparations 
take place outside the country (Stewart, 2012).  
Lack of demands and negotiations 
The siege of Nord-Ost lasted fifty-seven hours and the Chechen rebels publicised their 
demands to the Russian government through the media, as well as through the hostages 
they had at their disposal. The attackers used any channels of communication available to 
them to voice their demands and make sure that the Russian people knew what needed to be 
done to free the hostages. The hostages were ordered to call their families outside the 
theatre and implore them to march to the Red Square and demand an end to the Chechen 
occupation and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region (Lambroschini, 2003). Since 
Russian authorities refused to officially negotiate with the rebels, they summoned members 






government (Politkovskaya, 2010). However much they believed in the possibility of their 
demands being met, in the case of Nord-Ost it is evident that a great deal of effort was made 
by the terrorists to negotiate with the authorities and reach a solution with as few victims as 
possible.  
Nearly fifteen years later, one can note that attackers no longer voice 
demands or make any serious attempts to negotiate with the authorities unless they are 
already backed into a corner. The Paris attacks were suicide missions with the goal of killing 
as many people as possible, which can be seen from the methodology of the attack on Stade 
de France, as well as the fact that at Bataclan Hall the radicals opened fire on the crowd 
immediately, killing nearly a hundred people in the first ten minutes of the assault (BBC, 
2015). One of the participants in the Bataclan operation reported that the attackers voiced 
demands that the French and the Americans withdraw from Syria.  However, that turned out 
to be a stall tactic at the point where it was clear that the radicals were surrounded with no 
way out (Chrisafis, 2015). 
Move towards softer targets 
Considering the three trends listed above, it seems logical that smaller regional radical 
units with fewer resources and a goal to maximise loss of human life would move towards 
attacking softer, easier targets. According to some counter-terrorist experts, soft targets can 
be defined as civilian-centric places, which due to their nature are not typically fortified, be it 
due to their public access policy, resource constraints, or security not being the primary 
mission and concern of the venue (Hesterman, 2015). Some of the examples of soft targets 
are schools, plazas, and shopping malls, as well as cultural institutions like museums, 






security measures around the world in the recent years, however, before 9/11, they were not 
considered high risk targets either. This fact may have saved thousands of lives at Stade de 
France, where a properly executed security protocol prevented a terrorist wearing an 
explosive vest from entering a stadium full of sports fans. 
The public places listed above are not only attractive to attackers because of their 
open nature, which makes it easier to survey the territory and plan and carry out the assault, 
ultimately making the planning cycle shorter (Stewart, 2012). The locations in question are 
also frequented by average civilians, who are seen as “the innocents” by the general public, 
as opposed to those in military and law-enforcement professions, thereby leading to a bigger 
public outcry over the loss of civilian lives. 
When an attack on the civilian population is successful, there is a certain loss of 
credibility incurred by the government of the country targeted – it is seen as impotent and 
unable to protect its own citizens. The credibility lost by the authorities is quickly converted 
into increased credibility, recruiting power and funding of whichever radical group claimed the 













Chapter 2: Nord-Ost 
When researching the case of Nord-Ost, one has to be prepared to face some 
uncertainty when it comes to such things as the number of hostages and the number of 
fatalities. One reason for this is that even fourteen years after the crisis, many details of the 
case are still classified, and some are simply unknown, due to the negligence of the Russian 
criminal investigators and judicial authorities and their use of improper practices (nord-
ost.org, 2012;). Some of the most crucial information about the attack – how exactly did it 
happen that forty armed Chechen rebels managed to get hold of a theatre full of people in the 
centre of the Russian capital – is left for the press and the historians to piece together from 
the shreds of evidence they have at their disposal (Krechetnikov, 2012). 
It is generally accepted that approximately forty heavily armed terrorists arrived at the 
theatre in several cars, which they hastily abandoned in the parking lot in front of the 
Dubrovka Theatre (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2002). The attackers entered the empty lobby 
minutes after the beginning of the second act of the show, with the audience already seated 
and enjoying a tap-dance number by a group of actors dressed as soviet pilots. Their military 
costumes only added to the confusion when one of the attackers walked onto the stage out of 
the wings, came up to the puzzled performers and ordered them to take a seat among the 
audience members (TVCenter, 2012). Some of the theatregoers were still under the 
impression that it was all part of the show when more intruders, some dressed in military 
uniforms and some wearing traditional Arabic garb, filled the isles. This misperception was 
quickly dispelled when the attacker onstage lifted up his machine gun and fired into the air, 






the theatre was mostly under the control of terrorists, with an estimated 912 hostages inside, 
with nationals of eighteen countries among them (Krechetnikov, 2012).  
One of the missing details is what the attackers proceeded to do when they entered 
the building. While there were cameras in the parking lot outside of the theatre as well as 
inside the theatre auditorium, and footage captured by the journalists who were allowed into 
the theatre to speak to the rebels, there is little record of the attackers’ actions while out of 
sight of the hostages. What was done in those time intervals, however, is very important to 
understanding how this extremist action was orchestrated since this was when the militants 
gained access to the backstage and service areas of the venue and when the building was 
mined with explosives. The investigation after the fact uncovered that some of the attackers 
had started working on the construction site of a new nightclub, The Central Station, next 
door to Dubrovka Theatre over the summer of 2002 and had some of their weapons and 
explosives planted there ahead of time (Gorlanova, 2006). The club shared a wall with the 
venue, which enabled the radicals to gain control of the theatre faster and more discreetly 
since they did not have to carry all of their weaponry at the time of the attack.  
The fact that most of the explosives were planted ahead of time makes one fact clear: 
terrorists take their time to plan out and coordinate their attacks, sometimes travelling to 
potential target objects ahead of time to survey the object, and in some cases, even getting 
jobs at the venue to better understand the day-to-day operations of these places (Abdulaev, 
2002). The question this inevitably raises is: why are they prepared and we still are not? 
As mentioned above, the terrorists have, over the years, shifted from negotiating to 






experts. There is a much smaller margin of error, now, than there has ever been before when 
it comes to preventing terrorist attacks in theatres because of this change, as it makes the 
number of victims harder to mitigate and leaves counter-terrorism experts little to no room for 
negotiations. 
Overview of the incident  
While there are various detailed accounts by hostages of what was happening in the 
theatre auditorium in those dreadful three days, there is not much information on how the 
attackers behaved outside of it, which is the crucial to know in order to assess the necessary 
preventative security measures. This paper will attempt to reconstruct the events outside the 
auditorium using the pieces of evidence and few eyewitness accounts (Farber, 2014; 
Pravda.ru, 2012; nord-ost.org, 2002).  
According to the footage from the theatre auditorium, where the majority of hostages 
were held, the attackers first entered the hall from the stage, forcing the actors off the stage 
and firing into the air several times to show theatregoers how serious their intentions were 
(TVCenter, 2012). The only door leading through the left wings and onto the stage where the 
first rebel came from was located in the backstage area (Fig.1).  
According to some eyewitness reports, the attackers arrived at the theatre in several 
minivans, which they hastily abandoned in the parking area in front of the venue (Kolesnikov, 
2004). After entering through the glass doors of the main entrance the attackers moved 






The front of house staff consisted of ticket-takers, ushers, and merchandise and concession 
salesmen, who were in no way trained or qualified to handle any situations in which any kind 
of weapons were involved. The ticket-takers were usually positioned inside, by the front 
doors of the theatre; there were no bag checks or metal detectors in the venue at the time. By 
the time the terrorists entered the building it was close to 9pm, the second act of the show 
had already begun and there would have been very few people in the lobby, as most ushers 
and ticket-takers would usually withdraw deeper into the theatre, some seeing the show they 
came to love, some manning the doors to navigate any latecomers and bathroom-seekers 
(Kolesnikov, 2004).  
 The attackers walked through the lobby uninterrupted, walked past the doors to the 
auditorium and entered the glass doors leading to backstage areas. The door was guarded 
by a security guard seated at the door (Fig.1) on the backstage side of it (the security guards 
are indicated with blue stars). The security guard was unarmed, a fact which might have 
saved his life (Kolesnikov, 2004). No doubt, heavily armed terrorists would not hesitate to use 
their weapons had they noticed an armed security guard. Instead, according to some reports, 
the rebels tied the guard up and some time later brought him into the auditorium to join the 
rest of the hostages. The attackers then continued making their way further into the theatre, 
passing a small rehearsal studio and finally reaching the door leading to the stage. One of 
them walked up on the stage, rushed the actors off into the audience and announced what 
was happening to everyone present and firing several rounds of gunshots into the air 









While some of the assailants proceeded onto the stage to take control of the audience 
and announce to the horrified theatregoers what was in store for them, others continued 
checking the backstage and service areas as well as the second floor of the theatre, and 






concern for the personnel that was backstage, since there were only a few people still left 
there and they were dispersed across three floors of dressing rooms and various service 
rooms (TVCenter, 2012). 
There was a security guard stationed by the stage door, making sure the staff swiped 
their electronic ID cards when they arrived (Fig.1). However, there were no barriers to 
prevent people without such cards from gaining access to the backstage areas. On the left 
side of the guard was a door leading onto the stage, while to his right was a corridor leading 
to the dressing rooms, encircling the stage to lead out to the front lobby of the theatre. As 
stated above, the lobby was separated from the backstage area by a glass door with curtains 
over it and another security guard stationed next to it. Both guards were unarmed; however, 
while the first guard, stationed by the stage door could press an alarm button, he was shot 
and killed by the attackers, while the second guard’s main function was to secure access to 
backstage area from the front of house (Fig.1). He posed little threat to the armed Chechen 
rebels, a fact which may have saved his life.  
Some actors, stagehands and backstage personnel were able to escape through the 
windows in the dressing rooms, which were located in the second floor hallway and were 
separated from the staircases by steel doors cutting off access for the attackers on both 
ends. Locking these doors allowed the staff enough time to tie their costumes together and 
climb down the makeshift ropes to the street below. Some actors also managed to escape 
the building when the rescue services cut out the bars on the windows of the ground floor 
dressing rooms (Fig.1) (TVCenter, 2012). 
There were also theatre employees, who upon hearing gunshots over the intercom 






siege there. They were still in the same building, at risk of being blown up by the terrorists, 
however as it turned out when the building was stormed by the Russian special forces, these 
people were significantly safer than those who found themselves in the room with the 
attackers, if only because they avoided exposure to the opiate gas used on the attackers and 
hostages.   
After establishing their control over the audience, the militants then brought in a bomb 
and placed it in the centre of the auditorium, under the balcony. The attackers proceeded to 
mine and booby-trap the venue with over thirty additional charges placed within and around 
the auditorium (Fig.2). The terrorists claimed that there were enough explosives in the 
building to destroy five theatres the size of the Dubrovka Palace of Culture and they were 
prepared to go through with the threat unless the Russian government conceded to their 
demands to end the war in Chechnya and begin the withdrawal of troops from the Republic 
(Sokovnin, Jeglov, 2004).  
Eighteen out of the forty terrorists were women, so-called Black Widows – wives of slain 
Chechen rebels, who made it their mission to avenge their fathers and husbands by 
becoming “shahids” - suicide bombers. Each of the women was dressed in traditional Arabic 
costume, unusual for Chechnya, carrying a hand grenade in one hand and a gun in another, 
with a belt loaded with shrapnel and explosives strapped to their chests. The use of suicide 
bombers armed with self-made explosive devices may have only recently emerged in the 
United States however it has long been a methodology of choice for the Chechen extremists 
operating in Russia.  
The siege by the extremists proceeded to last for approximately three days, with 













Fifty-eight hours into the siege, Russian authorities ordered the beginning of a rescue 
operation, which entailed the release of an anaesthetic gas into the theatre through the air 
conditioning system followed by an assault by the Russian Special Forces, as well as the 
military, sniper divisions, special units of Spetcnaz: Alpha and Vimpel emergency rescue 






been confirmed that it was a derivative of Fentanyl – an opiate anaesthetic a lot more potent 
than morphine (Novaya Gazeta, 2008). The storm troopers began the rescue operation after 
spending the previous two days practicing in a theatre with a similar layout to that of the 
Dubrovka Theatre in order to reduce the potential for any surprises during the actual mission. 
(Sotnikov, 2012).  
Even at this late stage of the Nord-Ost hostage crisis there were still lessons to learn for 
Russian theatre owners and producers. One of the main objectives for the operatives after 
liquidating the extremists who could detonate the chain of explosive devices planted around 
the venue, was evacuating the hostages as swiftly as possible, in order to protect them from 
the possibility that the bombs could go off, and to minimize the danger from prolonged 
exposure to the gas that had been used. This proved to be difficult to achieve due to the 
seating layout of the venue and the lack of a central aisle (as can be seen from Figure 3, the 
Dubrovka theatre had a centre aisle within the first few rows only), which restricted access to 
the unconscious victims and delayed the evacuation. For this reason, having at least one full 
centre aisle is now a security requirement in all Moscow theatres.  
 
The Nord-Ost theatre crisis, or the Dubrovka tragedy as it is known in Russia, has claimed 
one hundred and thirty lives and left every hostage with lifelong health complications and 
psychological trauma. It is a fact that only five people were actually killed by the terrorists 
themselves over the course of those three nerve-racking October days, however this fact is 
as tragic as it is irrelevant for the purposes and the position of this paper. What is important is 
that the loss of so many lives could have been prevented through a more diligent approach to 







Source: Sotnikov, 2012 
 
A detail that some producers may find particularly interesting, is that while there was 
an attempt to revive the show after the tragedy, people were reluctant to come to the theatre, 
some expressing the disapproving view that the producers were trying to make money on a 
show that had such a tragic history. The touring version of the show also never took off and 
fifteen years after the tragedy there has been no commercially viable or successful 
production of the title.   
Looking at the aftermath of Nord-Ost from a theatre-owner perspective, one can notice 
that since Nord-Ost closed, the audiences were reluctant to come back to the venue, even 






has never housed a successful show in the fifteen years that have passed since the tragedy. 
While physical real estate can be rebuilt and refurbished, there is no magical solution for 
erasing people’s memories and associations, in which the name of the place and the play will 
forever be associated with death and anguish. While plays have the luxury of being brought 
back when they have been forgotten, theatres cannot afford the luxury of staying dark for too 
long.	A tragedy like this will forever taint the venue it transpired in and the show it housed at 
the time; fifteen years later, although the Russian people no longer remember what Nord-Ost 
was about; they strongly associate the name of the show and the theatre with the tragic 
events of the attach. While the producers tried to start the business back up, the shadow of 
the lost lives followed it wherever it went. 
Media impact 
During the siege of Nord-Ost the attackers closely monitored the major television 
channels and stayed very well informed about any movements outside the theatre. There 
were even suspicions of informers amongst the crowds outside the police lines, and, 
according to some reports, one accomplice to attackers was already in the theatre, dressed 
in civilian clothing and posing as an audience member when the siege began on October 23.  
On the second day, Anna Politkovskaya arrived to negotiate with the Chechens. She 
was a Russian journalist who had dedicated a big part of her life to reporting from the hot 
spots of the Caucasus region and had seen the horrors of war first-hand. The attackers 
trusted her to be more partial to their strife and had specifically requested her as a negotiator 
(Politkovskaya, 2010). Anna was allowed inside the theatre and, although she was unable to 






and water for the hostages to be brought in. Since at this moment, on the second day of the 
siege, Russian authorities still had not made any arrangements to better handle a hostage 
situation (such as at least having drinking water, food and basic first aid kits ready should the 
negotiators make progress in their negotiations with the terrorists), after receiving the 
permission from the terrorists, Anna exited the theatre and proceeded to purchase the bottled 
water and juice packs with money contributed by the surrounding cameramen, members of 
the press and bystanders.  
This incident raises a question: how is it possible that on the second day of a theatre 
siege, with over nine hundred hostages held inside, there was no water and food prepared in 
case an opportunity presented itself to bring it to the victims. It illustrates that it is far from 
enough to have security protocols in place, those in charge of crisis management have to 
account for the changes in the situation as they occur and respond and adjust their strategy 
accordingly.   
Chechens allowed some other members of press to enter the theatre in order to 
interview their leader, Movsar Baraev, who was constantly monitoring the press coverage the 
siege was receiving on a television set inside one of the venue’s service areas. According to 
Anton Deduh, one of the Russian TV reporters who went to interview the attackers, the 
theatre lobby was not guarded when the journalists entered the theatre and they did not 
encounter anyone until they ascended to the second floor of the building where the bar area 
was located.  
While some of the footage recorded by the reporters assisted the rescue and military 






than good from the first moments of the attack. Members of the media would go so far as to 
suggest on live television the possibility of storming the venue, asking some of the show's 
staff about the theatre's entry points and possibilities of an assault as a potential rescue 
method (Simpson, 2002), thereby potentially warning the attackers and giving them time to 
prepare. The case of Nord-Ost prompted some changes in the Russian laws regarding 
freedom of information during a state of emergency. 
In times of such emergency situations, especially hostage situations, when civilian 
lives may depend on the smallest whim of the attackers, it is vital that the media is very 
careful about what is being said on air and how it is phrased. In today's world of social 
networks and ever-present media, the ease with which the extremists can monitor updates is 
unprecedented. This is why, as soon as an emergency situation is declared, the media has to 
coordinate together with the police and crisis-management specialists in order to report on 
the story without triggering the attackers or unintentionally helping them by reporting 
strategically important information. It should be noted that it is not being suggested that the 
media narrative be dictated by the government or that the media must be shut off completely 
during such emergency situations. However, a situation in which the media makes matters 
worse by leaking a vital piece of information should be avoided at all costs. Just like television 
has limitations in terms of the language that can be used and what imagery can be shown, it 
is not too drastic of a measure for media to take special care when selecting the information 
to publish during a state of emergency situation. Where human lives depend on the actions of 









The layout of the Dubrovka Palace of Culture was one of the reasons why this 
particular venue was chosen for the attack. The theatre had only two active entrances at the 
time: the main entrance and the stage door, which made it much easier for the attackers to 
control and block those exits. As noted above, the two security guards that were stationed at 
the theatre were located at the stage door and the door leading from the front of house to the 
backstage areas. This made it even easier for the Chechens to gain access to the theatre 
and take control of the building. According to the investigation that followed the Nord-Ost 
attack, the extremists initially were considering several other targets around Moscow, such as 
the Bolshoi Theatre, which had numerous exits and enough security measures in place for 
the terrorists to reject it as too complicated of an object (Sokovnin, Jeglov 2004; NewsRu, 
2002). 
Another venue considered was the MDM Theatre, which on the night of October 23 was 
hosting former Russian president Boris Yeltsin (Bogachev, 2016). However, the MDM 
Theatre was also rejected due to the complexity of the building, which had over sixteen 
entrances. Dubrovka Theatre, where Nord-Ost had found its home, had a much simpler 
configuration, and was used as a template for many so-called Palaces of Culture – 
community centres built during the soviet era across the country. While this enabled the 
Russian Special Forces and rescue brigades to practice the assault and plan the operation to 
the smallest details by practicing in a venue with a similar configuration (Sotnikov, 2012), this 
generic layout of the theatre also made the planning easier for the Chechen rebels. This 






most attractive targets for attacks of this kind. Alarmingly, almost all of the Broadway theatres 






















Chapter 3: November 2015 Paris attacks 
A series of coordinated attacks by the Islamic State militants in Paris shook the world 
on November 13, 2015. Six separate attacks were carried out by the attackers, the first of 
which took place outside of the Stade de France, a stadium north of Paris. What followed 
were a series of shootings in four different locations outside cafes and restaurants of the 10th 
and 11th arrondissements in Paris (Fig.4). The horrific chain of events then culminated in an 
attack on the Bataclan hall, which was hosting the American band Eagles of Death Metal that 
night. For the purposes of this paper, the particular focus will be on the two entertainment 









Stade de France 
The first attack of the evening occurred at approximately 9:20 pm on November 13, 
2015 outside the Stade de France, where a match between the French and German football 
teams was taking place. President François Hollande was in attendance enjoying the game 
among tens of thousands of fans. According to a security guard who was on duty that night, 
at least one of the attackers held a ticket to the game and was stopped from entering the 
stadium after being frisked by a guard. As a result of a pat-down it was discovered that the 
man in question was wearing a suicide vest, which he proceeded to detonate while backing 
away from the guards (Robinson, 2015). The police confirmed that the attacker’s aim was to 
set his vest off inside the stadium that can accommodate up to eighty thousand spectators, 
provoking chaos, and a stampede that would undoubtedly claim hundreds of lives (Burridge, 
2015, Baker, 2015).  
Minutes after the first attack, two more explosions were heard; one outside the 
stadium and another at a nearby McDonald’s, killing the bombers themselves and one 
civilian. Judging from the fact that only one of the three militants held a ticket to the game that 
night, the police have concluded that the first explosion was planned to happen inside the 
premises of the stadium, causing a stampede towards the exits, where two more suicide 
bombers would be waiting. After the first attacker failed to gain access to the stadium, his 
accomplices may have decided to proceed with the bombings outside the venue (Burridge, 






The failure of this attack demonstrates the importance of even the smallest 
adjustments in security protocols for mass cultural, sporting and religious events. Were the 
security frisking teams not in use on the night, this individual attack might not have resulted in 
just four deaths (including the three assailants); we can only imagine what the consequences 
could have been if the attack went as planned. According to the French investigators, it was a 
combination of bad timing and organization on the part of the attackers, as well as the well-
established security protocols, that prevented mass casualties at Stade de France that night 
(Baker, 2015; Robinson, 2015). This particular incident also raises a question: would a simple 
bag check suffice to identify an attacker disguising a suicide vest under his clothes, or would 
it allow a bomber to access the venue, leaving thousands of civilian targets contained in a 
large, enclosed space at his mercy? Had the metal frames been in use, the attacker would 
have been easily identified, whether they are armed or wearing a suicide vest. This illustrates 
the usefulness of metal frames at the entrances to venues with large capacities. 
Bataclan 
In contrast to the attack at the Stade de France, which can by all accounts be 
considered a failure of the attackers, the assault on Bataclan - a beloved Parisian concert 
venue, proved to be extremely deadly, claiming at least eighty-nine lives in its wake.  
The attack started at approximately 9:40 pm and lasted for more than two hours until 
the BRI (Brigade Rapid Intervention) and the French police put an end to it close to 1:00 am 
on November 14.  
Four attackers entered the concert hall about an hour into the set and, according to 






before unleashing several rounds of gunshots on their victims (France24, 2015). The attack 
lasted approximately ten to fifteen minutes and killed at least eighty-seven people. Some 
witnesses also reported hearing the militants say: "You are bombing with the Americans, so 
we are targeting you and the Americans," indicating that the two countries are tied together in 
the eyes of Islamic militants as the adversaries to beliefs of radical Islam (France24, 2015). 
According to the police officers who arrived at the scene first and, unsure of the 
situation, were waiting for backup outside the hall's entrance, the attackers were aware of 
their presence and were making demands that French and American troops withdraw from 
Syria (Aoubourg, 2015). 
According to the police, there were six security guards at the concert venue on the 
night of the assault (Aoubourg, 2015). There is no indication as to whether they were armed 
or not, however, in order to have been effective in preventing the four armed attackers from 
gaining access to the venue, they would need to have been trained in handling fire arms. 
Without such training, even if the guards carried weapons, they would have proven to be a 
danger to civilians as well as the attackers amidst such a chaotic situation. This suggests that 
it may be worthwhile having armed security guards on site, or perhaps having an armoury 
room in the venue in order to allow the security to arm themselves should such a need arise. 
However, it is vital that such rooms are properly secured, with only essential and trained 
personnel knowing about and being granted access to them. This measure is already in use 
in some theatres in Russia, however the fact of their existence and the whereabouts of such 
rooms in theatres are only known to the relevant security professionals and theatre owners 






According to a survey of over two hundred and fifty theatregoers, conducted in two 
major Moscow theatres, out of the list of six proposed security measures in use in those 
venues, armed security guards were the least popular option, followed by having the theatre 
checked by the canine bomb units (Bogacheva, 2016). This, of course, does not necessarily 
mean that these measures should be avoided completely by the theatre owners; it merely 
indicates which measures should not be visible to the audience members in order to avoid 
unnecessary stress for the attendees. The survey in question was conducted using a 
questionnaire, handed out at the MDM and Rossiya theatres in Moscow, which accommodate 
approximately 1800 audience members every night. The survey was conducted for the 
purposes of this paper and asked the participants to rate various security measures 
according to their perceived usefulness. The participants were also asked which measures 
they thought were redundant and what they would add or get rid of if they could.  
The survey showed that the respondents’ feeling of safety largely depended on which 
theatre they were attending, and illustrates the usefulness of “security theatre”, if only to 
make the patrons feel safe. The investigation also highlighted that while Russian 
theatregoers would not change anything about the security measures and protocols in place 
at the moment, they indicated that they were not comfortable in the presence of armed 
security. It was also found that Russians did not feel comfortable around sniffer dogs, as it 
made them wonder whether there was something wrong and look for a threat. While the 
audience members disliked bag checks because they found them annoying, they indicated 
that they understood their necessity and supported their use in theatres. It was established 






theatres, they were used to them and thought they were the lesser of evils (Bogacheva, 
2016). 
The research conducted by Doctor Martin Gill, analysing the responses of convicted 
murderers on death row, indicated that their main reason for attacking a target is because it 
seems easy (Gill, 2008). The same research showed that CCTV cameras do not deter 
perpetrators; in fact, their presence may escalate the actions of the attacker as after they 
have already been recorded on camera they are expecting to be caught anyway. However, 
the respondents admitted that they were more concerned by a possibility of encountering 
either civilians, who could alert the authorities, or law enforcement and security personnel, 
than any kind of technology, perhaps due to the unpredictable nature of human behaviour. 
This means that having security guards stationed at a venue's entrances may help prevent 
an attack, creating an appearance of a more fortified target than the attackers would like to 
engage.  
It should be noted, however, that the same respondents indicated that encountering a 
lone security guard would make a decision to shoot and kill easier for them as it eliminates a 
key witness and evidence of the attack. This issue could potentially be solved by pairing 
security guards up when on duty as well as placing multiple alarm buttons around the theatre 
in order to allow other employees to alert the police and relevant authorities should they 
witness something dangerous.     
It should also be noted that while the need to dispose of any witnesses will be one of 
the highest priorities for a murderer who is hoping to avoid the consequences of their crime, 






death and thus are not concerned with the consequences of their actions. This means that 
their actions would be more unpredictable: on one hand if the mission in question is a suicide 
one, the attacker would not be worried about being identified by the authorities and may not 
see the need for killing the witness; on the other hand, the attacker would also not likely be 
concerned with the consequences of another killing and may decide to kill anyone they 



















Chapter 4: Possible effects of implementing additional security measures 
Monetary Costs 
According to Peter Entin of the Shubert Organization, the services of explosive 
detection canine units in Broadway theatres are currently costing each show approximately 
$600 per week. This expense is incurred in addition to nearly $3500 in other security costs 
each week, a number that for a Broadway play with $400,000 weekly running costs can 
amount to close to one percent (Entin, 2016). While the security measures currently in place 
at the Broadway theatres may cost only $4000 per week, implementing such precautions as 
metal frames and additional security personnel will cost theatre owners and therefore 
eventually the shows themselves more than that. Walk through metal detector frames, 
however, are a one-time purchase of approximately $5,000, the cost of which can be 
amortised over time and over the runs of several shows. 
The minimum security measures that are in place across all of the Broadway theatres 
are overseen through the Broadway League security advisory committee, however some 
individual theatre owners like Disney Theatrical Group, tend to implement additional security 
measures in the venues where their shows run (Amendola, 2016). The reasoning behind 
those additional measures may differ depending on the organization. Disney is a beloved and 
extremely recognizable American family entertainment brand, sometimes synonymous with 
dreams, childhood and happy endings, which are some of the things terrorism seeks to rob 
its victims of. Another reason that this particular company has more advanced security 
measures is likely due to Disney operating a theme parks division in many countries, 






been a popular destination for tourists from all around the world and its daily foot traffic is too 
high to get away with implementing just the minimum security measures.  
Labour issues 
According to some theatre owners, it may prove to be challenging to implement certain 
measures like credentialing and backstage access zoning. Credentialing would entail an 
identity check at the stage door in order to ensure that only those who are taking part in a 
particular performance are allowed backstage. Zoning is a practice of breaking the theatre 
venue into access zones, which when combined with credentialing allows various levels of 
access to different categories of employees (for example front of house employees, 
backstage employees, and those who are allowed in both zones. These measures may prove 
difficult to implement in Broadway theatres due to labour issues and the way theatre 
operates. An example of this is an orchestra employing substitute musicians, which can be 
an obstacle to introducing an electronic ID system because the substitutes would have to be 
issued a new ID card every time, which would lead to a dissemination of too many passes, 
compromising the system’s effectiveness with too many people having access backstage 
(Entin, 2016).  This issue is solved in Russian theatres by having a security guard posted by 
the stage door with a list of visitors and personnel authorized to enter the building that the 
head of security receives from the House Manager and Company Manager every day. This 
way, the personnel that find themselves in the theatre every day receive magnetic ID cards 
so they can access the necessary areas of the theatre; while those in substitute positions are 
added to the sign-in sheet given to the security guard. Another complication is that theatre 
owners rarely know in advance whom exactly their orchestra will be comprised of on any 






security concerns could however be addressed at the next collective bargaining session with 
Local 802 in order to modify the rules and allow for additional enhanced security measures. It 
is easier, cheaper and perhaps even more uplifting to install several doors and program a few 
hundred ID cards than to deal with the consequences of a terrorist act because too many 
people worked at the venue and it was hard to keep track.  
Human rights 
There will always be people who, upon hearing a proposal of increased security 
measures, will oppose it, some without even hearing what exactly is being proposed, claiming 
their constitutional freedoms are being impinged upon. An example of this was the public 
outcry in 2010, when TSA introduced several new rules for security check at the airports. 
Various advocacy groups immediately called for protests and even encouraged those 
travelling on Thanksgiving to opt-out of the body scans, branding it the National Opt-Out day 
(Gonzalez, Goodman, 2010). However, the measures proposed in this paper would not 
diminish anyone’s rights. In fact, these measures have been implemented in theatres around 
countries that have seen their entertainment venues attacked and the audiences are not even 
aware of most of them (Anonymous Theatre Official, 2016; Bogacheva, 2016). Ultimately, if 
the recommended measures and some small inconveniences they may entail contribute in 
any way to avoiding a terrible tragedy and consequent losses of human lives, it seems that 
the benefits outweigh the costs. 
Effects on the Box Office 
As can be seen from the story of Nord-Ost, an attack on a theatre can have irreparable 
consequences for both the show in question and the venue itself. Nord-Ost was not able to 






While becoming a symbol of Russian resilience when it was revived after the tragedy, the 
name of the show also became closely associated with the tragedy many generations of 
Russians remember well as one of the major terrorist attacks on the Russian capital of the 
last twenty years.  
The venue itself has never bounced back either, it has become a site of remembrance 
for the victims and their families, with a memorial board placed near the marquee, listing all 
the lives lost in this theatre. A church was also built across from the venue, serving as 
constant reminder of what happened. As previously stated, the Dubrovka Palace of Culture 
has housed many shows over the past fifteen years, however none of them were successful, 
partly due to theatregoers’ reluctance to enjoy a night out at a theatre where so many died 
(Lvov, 2003). 
Infrastructure 
When considering the effects of a potential terrorist attack on one of the Broadway 
theatres, the first thing that comes to mind is the loss of human lives. Human lives are, of 
course, the ultimate price that will be paid should an attack of that kind ever occur, however 
one has to also remember that the vast majority of Broadway houses are architectural and 
historical landmarks. The damage or destruction of such landmarks would not only be loss of 
theatre real estate, but it would also cost the City one of its architectural treasures. The 
monetary costs of renovating a Broadway house and the loss of potential profits from having 
a dark theatre over the course of the renovations should also be considered. Broadway’s 
attractiveness for tourists should not be discounted either: according to the Broadway 
League’s data, over the course of 2014-2015 Season 10.8 million tickets to Broadway shows 






York with a goal of seeing a Broadway show and for some it is a family tradition. In the 2014-
2015 Season, Broadway contributed approximately 12.7 billion to the economy of New York 
City (Broadway League, 2016). Should an attack on a Broadway theatre ever occur, it is hard 
to imagine the devastating effect it will have on the industry and, by extension, on the flow of 
tourists to the city, who would not feel safe in the city, let alone a theatre.    
Recommendations 
While there is no such information when it comes to the events in Paris, it has been 
established that while planning Nord-Ost, the terrorists were considering several other targets 
such as the Bolshoy Theatre, the Estrada Theatre (home to the musical Chicago at the time), 
as well as MDM Theatre, where a Broadway transfer of 42nd Street was running that fall 
(Sokovnin, Jeglov, 2004). One other known target was the building of Russian parliament, 
which was rejected once the attackers realised how much security they would have to 
circumvent in order to take control of the building.  
MDM Theatre was rejected because it had a very complex layout, with many points of 
entry, vast underground spaces and too many various small vendors located within the 
building, which made it a very difficult venue to take and maintain control of. The Bolshoy 
Theatre building was too complicated for a long effective siege, both due to a large number of 
entry points to hold under control and high levels of security, which left the attackers to 
choose between the two Moscow theatres that did not pose those problems.  
This selection process shows that while their goal in most cases is to inflict fear and 
destruction, the terrorists are not likely to be overly insistent on a particular target if it might 






of time. This leads to a conclusion that if a target seems hard enough to infiltrate or attack, 
the potential attackers are likely to move on to considering another location for their act. 
Another benefit of having visible security measures in theatres is that they may comfort 
theatre patrons, making them feel safer, as well as showing them that part of the ticket price 
they paid went toward ensuring their safety on the night. 
It should be noted that a range of security measures is available to theatre owners, 
some intended to stop radicals from targeting a venue, some in order to stop them from 
successfully infiltrating the theatre and others – to make it harder to take control of the whole 
venue, such as a combination of backstage credentialing and zoning.  
Surveillance and Procedures 
Bag checks 
Bag checks are among those bare minimum measures already present on Broadway. 
Most Broadway theatres started using bag checks after the Paris attacks in November 2015. 
However as of summer 2016, this is the only kind of screening that audience members go 
through on their way into the theatre. Any regular Broadway theatregoer can attest to how 
cursory the glance of a bag checker is when they look inside a handbag. Even crowd-
pleasers like Hamilton, which on any night may be host to a Hollywood celebrity or, perhaps, 
a world leader do not seem to make any attempts to be more thorough. In a country with the 
highest number of guns per capita and extremely lax gun control laws such attitude seems 








One of the most obvious security measures that were implemented in all major 
theatres of Moscow immediately after the theatre siege of 2002 was the installation of metal 
frames by their main entrances. Metal frames combined with routine bag checks became the 
new reality for Russian theatregoers, however after what happened that fall people would 
have been surprised not to see the action taken. While many theatre producers would argue 
that such measures are over the top and would slow down the process of the audience let-in, 
there is no reason why this procedure could not start an hour before curtain time instead of 
thirty minutes for the sake of increased safety. As stated above, this measure has been in 
use in Russian theatres for over a decade and while it would mean opening the doors for the 
audience an hour before curtain time, there have been no issues with this so far. Moreover, 
this measure is already in use in many US institutions like museums, big entertainment 
venues (for example Madison Square Garden), as well as in many schools (especially after 
numerous school shootings have taken place). Of course there would be certain financial 
ramifications in calling the theatre personnel and show employees half an hour earlier – it 
could require the payment of additional compensation to many workers. However, the 
financial cost in this case is far outweighed by the loss of lives, money and audiences that a 
tragedy would bring about. 
Metal frames, along with wands, pat-downs and sniffer dog checks are the only 
effective ways to identify a suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest, belt, or carrying an 
improvised explosive device. The use of frames and wands can also prevent a person from 
bringing their fire arm into the venue, a measure that seems to be much needed in the United 






Asking patrons to arrive at the theatre thirty minutes earlier seems to be a small price to pay 
considering the possible dreadful consequences of staying passive.  
Security Presence 
Establishing a security presence at a venue is not only important to prevent terrorist 
attacks, but also to discourage any disorderly behaviour at the theatre in general. While the 
job of security personnel has significantly expanded beyond being just guards since 9/11 and 
the threats seem as serious as ever, a number of theatre organizations have expressed a 
conviction that the guards should not seem intimidating to the patrons. Disney theatres even 
employ the term “hosts” to indicate security professionals (Amendola, 2016). 
One reason why theatre owners want friendly “hosts” would be that the more 
approachable the guard, the more likely patrons are to go to them should they notice 
something suspicious happening at the theatre. Security professionals are also trained to 
look for and factor in the specific suspicious behaviours and body language exhibited and to 
assess the general demeanour of the patrons making their way inside the theatre before the 
show.  
Not only should the security presence be established across all the Broadway 
theatres, it also has to be standardised. This is not, however to mean that all the security 
protocols and the number of security personnel is to be the exact same across all venues. It 
is important that all the theatres are evenly protected and no facility stands out as being an 
easy target because that venue will be the obvious choice for anyone looking to attack 
(Amendola, 2016). The security protocols and procedures in place should vary from theatre 
to theatre, depending on the layout, number of entrances and location of the venue. An 






would require less supervision, as opposed to the Winter Garden, exposed to the street on 
two sides with many entrances. 
Exterior Security Cameras 
According to some theatre owners, all of the Broadway venues have long been 
equipped with security cameras, however, the newest approach is to make the cameras more 
conspicuous and allow people to see they are being recorded (Amendola, 2016; Entin, 2016). 
The measure is intended to make the patrons feel safer by showing that their security is 
being taken seriously, while the “Big Brother effect” discourages any potential antisocial 
behaviour. Some theatres are installing monitors showing the camera feed to the people in 
the box office and the front lobbies (Amendola, 2016). To some extent just the presence of 
the cameras is likely to discourage potential attackers, adding to the effect of security theatre, 
and perhaps, if the security professionals are vigilant, the camera feed may help identify 
suspicious behaviour and help prevent an assault altogether. However, one needs to note 
that in cases where an attack is organized by suicide bombers, the presence of cameras 
does nothing to avert a tragic outcome once the attack has begun, since assailants who do 
not expect to survive the assault are not likely to be very concerned about leaving behind 
evidence of their activities. As stated before, not all the measures proposed in this paper are 
designed to physically stop an attack, however cameras allow security personnel to survey 
the venue and determine whether any suspicious individuals keep coming back to familiarise 
themselves with the territory. 
Sniffer dog sweeps 
As stated by some of the investigators of the Nord-Ost case, the terrorists had planted 






masquerading as construction workers. While it might be cumbersome and time-consuming 
to conduct background checks on every person who works in the building that is occupied by 
other unrelated vendors and businesses as well as the theatre itself, carrying out random 
sniffer dog checks is not out of the realm of possibility. In fact, random sweeps by Special 
Forces with canine units have been customary in Russian theatres ever since 2002 
(Bogachev, 2016). Moreover, sniffer dogs are now being used daily as an additional measure 
during the audience let-in, combined with bag checks and metal frame screening.  
According to some theatre professionals, the use of explosive canine units on Broadway 
has been a fairly recent implementation and has proven to be quite popular with the 
audience, as well as cast and crew members, who enjoy seeing dogs around and are even 
sometimes allowed to pet them (Entin, 2016; Amendola, 2016). This contrasts the attitude 
demonstrated by the respondents to the survey conducted in Moscow theatres, that the 
presence of sniffer dogs unnerves them and makes them wonder if they are in danger 
(Bogacheva, 2016). This may indicate that while sniffer dogs are necessary, depending on 
the audience feedback they receive, theatre owners may find that it is better to conduct the 
checks of the venues discreetly. It may be worthwhile for theatre owners and producers to 
conduct audience surveys following the initial implementation of any drastic security 
measures in their theatres in order to better understand their impact on their patrons and 
calibrate their visibility or severity accordingly. 
Every canine is accompanied by a handler who is usually a member of the police or ex-
military, trained to respond to a situation in which the dog finds something. They watch the 
dog’s reaction and act accordingly (Amendola, 2016). The canine units are likely to act as a 






suggested by the anecdotal evidence that Disney Theatrical Group and the Shubert 
Organization, among other theatre owners and operators, have gathered from patrons (Entin, 
2016; Amendola 2016). Sniffer dogs can detect explosives planted in a theatre and prevent 
such cases as Nord-Ost, where the explosives were hidden in the theatre building ahead of 
time, undetected for several months. In this way, canine units can be both a preventive 
measure, in the sense that they would find the explosives if they were hidden at the venue, 
as well as a deterrent for the attackers, as seeing sniffer dogs would likely make them 
reconsider their choice of target venue. 
Communication, Training and Preparedness 
Staff Training and Security Protocols 
While having surveillance systems and methods in place, it is vital that the employees of 
the theatres and the productions are adequately prepared for emergency situations similar to 
those which have already occurred in other countries and therefore may happen in New York 
City. Theatre owners must have security protocols in place in the event of various man-made 
threats, as well as natural hazards or in the case of something happening in front of the 
theatre or close by. It is unclear whether these protocols are currently in place at the 
Broadway theatres; however, the discussion at the Broadway League Spring Road 
Conference in 2016 highlighted that whatever protocols are in place at the moment are not 
sufficient in opinion of local law enforcement and security professionals. This was evident 
from the way they were desperately trying to convince the audience that the security 
measures were needed at all, not just which ones exactly. They were addressing the 
audience of theatre producers, presenters and owners, who judging by the audience reaction 






some people within the theatre industry express their exhaustion over their unsuccessful 
attempts to prove a security update was needed, especially considering that those attempts 
usually resulted in them being branded as fear mongers. It is imperative that the staff of the 
theatre is trained and drilled on those protocols as, depending on the situation in the area, the 
order from the local police may be to not evacuate the audience, or to shelter in place. In 
these cases the staff has to be able to calm the audience and looking unsure of what to do in 
such a situation is far from helpful (Amendola, 2016).  
While ensuring the presence of necessary and justified security measures in theatres 
is one of the main responsibilities of theatre owners as well as the producers, it should not fall 
solely on their shoulders. According to Dana Amendola, Vice President of Operations at 
Disney Theatrical Group, it is imperative that every single person working at the theatre in 
question knows that they play a part in making the venue safer through their alertness and 
awareness (Amendola, 2016; Stewart, 2010). People who spend their days working at or 
near the theatre know its every beat and would be the first ones to notice if anything is out of 
the ordinary, like a strange vehicle parked outside for several days in a row, or perhaps 
unfamiliar people acting suspiciously. The perfect illustration of this is the Times Square car-
bombing attempt of 2010, where a street vendor, selling posters off a street cart, noticed a 
strange vehicle parked outside the Minskoff Theatre (Amendola, 2016). The car had smoke 
coming out of it and the vendor proceeded to alert a mounted police officer (Frean). 
It also highlights the need for theatre owners and operators to be absolutely aware of and 
have complete control over any and all of the service areas located in their venue. In the case 






such as a hotel, community centre, or, in the case of movie theatres – a shopping mall, it is 
vital that communication is established with neighbouring businesses and the shared security 
protocols are created and practiced (Amendola, 2016).  
Additionally, there are training programs provided by local so-called Shield branches of 
the police in across America include Evacuation Training, Active Shooter Situation Training, 
as well as Terrorism Awareness training for security professionals. Teaching the staff and 
running regular drills will require a certain time investment on behalf of all the parties 
involved, however the more informed and prepared the staff is, the fewer casualties may 
occur in panic and chaos. It is beneficial for theatre owners to familiarize their staff and 
security personnel with the venue and train them for various possible situations that may 
occur and handling the patrons in those scenarios. While some of the training is currently 
being done with theatre employees, it is not being done to the same level at all theatres, 
which is vital according to Dana Amendola, in order to avoid making one theatre stand out at 
a more attractive target. 
Involve your entire staff. 
As stated above training the staff what to do in case of emergency situations is important, 
however it is also imperative that every person working in the venue understands that their 
awareness and alertness have a very important role to play in ensuring their safety, as well 
as that of their colleagues and the audience of the show. Theatre owners may employ 
security professionals and the police presence in the area may be high, but no person is 
better equipped to notice suspicious behaviour somewhere than those who spend their days 






comfortable approaching their superiors to report anything out of the ordinary and do not wait 
to see if the situation is critical enough to speak up.  
Establish communication with your neighbours 
As stated before, the May 2010 Times Square bombing attempt was first brought to 
the attention of the police by a street vendor, located on a sidewalk outside the Minskoff 
Theatre. He spotted a suspicious van with smoke coming out of it and alerted the mounted 
police. This example illustrates the need for establishing open channels of communication 
between the theatre and its neighbours. This applies to outside vendors and offices located 
within the building, as well as across the street and in the close vicinity of the venue. They 
may be the ones to notice something out of the ordinary and it is imperative that they know 
how to reach you and know you well enough to feel comfortable doing so promptly 
(Amendola, 2016). It is hard to evaluate to what extent the theatre owners are familiar with 
their neighbours and how open the communication channels are. The example of the failed 
attempt on the Minskoff Theatre is just one anecdotal piece of evidence of good 
communication. This communication should go further and deeper than chance encounters 
and small talk on the way to work; there must be a specific communication protocol in place 
and the neighbours should know exactly how to contact the company executives as well as 
the manager in charge of the theatre at any given moment. It is the responsibility of the 
theatre owners to establish this protocol because producers and their shows come and go, 
while theatre owners are the ones who provide consistency from year to year. 
Access Control 
It may seem like an obvious thing to do, but the doors of the venue should be locked 






commonplace that the loading dock of the theatre is open during the load-in and load-out, 
with no security supervising the exits, making it easy to enter the theatre unnoticed. Leaving 
the dock or stage door of the theatre propped open temporarily, for example while on a break 
during a load-in, can provide those with malicious intent access to the venue,  
Backstage zoning and Credentialing 
One of the features of the Soviet-era built Dubrovka Palace of Culture were heavy 
steel doors flanking the hallways on the second and third floors of the backstage areas, left in 
the venue from its previous tenancies. As was demonstrated by the 2002 siege, as 
unintentional as it was, the presence of these doors proved to be an effective security 
measure that helped rescue quite a few staff members from the building.  
Following this example, theatre owners around the world may find it beneficial to 
consider compartmentalising backstage areas of the theatres and separating those areas 
with steel doors, which could be locked in case of an emergency and would only grant access 
to those carrying magnetic ID cards. This would limit the number of people who would have 
access to particular areas of the theatre as well as slow down the attackers and give theatre 
employees backstage more time to escape should there ever be an attack on the theatre. 
The electronic system can be disabled at any time should that be necessary, but could 
provide a barrier for the attackers and prevent them from gaining complete control over the 
building. As we have seen with Nord-Ost, the majority of people who were able to lock 
themselves in those areas of the building separated by reinforced lockable doors, were 
rescued by the Russian Special Forces and spared the fate of spending three terrifying days 
under siege.  






Working With the Local Police 
Just like cooperating with the businesses surrounding the theatre and sharing 
information with them, theatre owners should Involve their local police and ensure that clear 
and open communication channels are established and maintained with them at all times. 
Working with the police should not be a measure reserved for special occasions like galas 
and opening nights and high profile visits by diplomatic delegations and heads of state 
(Amendola, 2016). According to Peter Entin, theatre owners, as well as the Broadway 
League on behalf of the producers, regularly work with New York Police Department and it 
seems that the communication channels are established. How well those channels are 
maintained obviously depends on the people in charge and the way they manage and share 
information. 
Government Liaisons Assigned to Theatres 
When the attack in the Moscow theatre happened, it was the hostages, who became 
the source of information for everyone on the outside. There was no alarm button in the 
theatre that could be pressed in order to call the emergency services. As a result, the 
Russian authorities found out about the crisis from friends and families of hostages. This was 
why shortly after these tragic events every theatre in Moscow was outfitted with emergency 
alarm buttons and was assigned a special liaison at the Department of Homeland Security, 
an individual who has the direct line to the highest government officials of Russia and has 
been specially trained to handle extreme situations. Such measures would minimize the 
response time of any special forces, emergency and medical teams that may be needed at 








With so many events that are happening around the world we cannot afford to just turn 
a blind eye on security and not be thorough when it comes to the protocols in place.  
Ensuring the security of their patrons and employees is the shared responsibility of 
theatre owners and producers. Broadway in particular is a potential target due to its location 
both in the heart of Manhattan and next door to Times Square. The best way to avoid an 
attempt of an attack is to make Broadway theatres less appealing as targets by tightening the 
security across all the theatres simultaneously. In order to ward off the aggressors it is not 
necessary to turn cultural institutions into impregnable fortresses and install draconian 
security measures and background checks of all the patrons, a balanced and reasonable 
combination of “security theatre” and security protocols and precautions in place can achieve 
the same purpose.   
It is baffling how lightly the Broadway theatre community is taking the matter of theatre 
security at this point. After all that has happened in New York and around the world, it would 
hardly be a surprise if another attack was in the works. There is currently a combination of a 
surprising and stubborn argument that more security measures would mean that we as a 
society have succumbed to terrorists’ goals and that we are finally scared. Another position is 
that since New York City has a lot to offer, terrorists will pick some other target for their 
attacks (Entin, 2016). This would be true if theatres in the United States were not some of the 
“softest” targets around, save for the shopping malls, and New York – the symbol of 
multiculturalism – were not the crossroads of the world.  
Interestingly, the issue does not seem to be the reluctance of theatre owners and 






disturb the patrons and change the way Broadway is used to working. It is, however, 
essential that Broadway catches up with the rest of the world before reality catches up with 
Broadway. More stringent security measures will be implemented on Broadway eventually. 
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